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CHAPTER 6 
Government and tlie Hill Tribes of Laos 
G. M. T. OSBORN 
INTRODUCTION 
The intention of this paper is to provide a condensed picture 
of the tribal peoples of Laos—of the conditions they live in today 
and what is being done to alleviate their hardships resulting 
from isolation, war, and a traditional lack of interest in their 
welfare and development. To give the picture its proper perspec-
tive, it should be mentioned that the writer has, to date, served 
twenty months in Laos as an adviser to the Royal Government 
on the administration of hill tribes. He has, therefore, not been 
specifically concerned with research and study of tribal groups, 
but more with their general administration and with bringing 
them practical help. It should not be inferred from this that 
the importance of research has been overlooked; on the contrary, 
the writer is fully aware that ideally and given normal conditions, 
research and study are necessary precursors to formulating ad-
ministrative policy for tribal peoples and that, following this, 
research should continue to run parallel to development planning 
and its implementation. Regrettably, the situation in Laos has 
for many years precluded the launching of a balanced research 
program, and hence the information that is available from past 
anthropological and social studies devoted specifically to tliese 
problems is scarce. 
For the purposes of this paper the writer has made the assump-
tion that the readers have a fair understanding of the political 
vicissitudes of Laos over the past twenty years and have some 
knowledge of the current situation, which has inevitably affected 
the tribal peoples. 
Although the contents of this paper are largely based on the 
writers personal experience and observations, information from 
other sources has been included (e.g. statistical). In such cases 




t ^ K 
;„: - f - ; - ! ' . y 
LAOS: C. MYLES T. OSBORN 
checks for accuracy have been made wherever possible. The 
opinions expressed, except where otherwise indicated, are per-
sonal to the writer. In the text the term "tribal" refers to hill 
tribes as distinct from the Lao. 
POPTRLATION, ETHNIC DISTIUBUTION, AND LANGUAGES 
The population of Laos (all races) is variously estimated in 
the absence of any formal census at between L75 and 2.3 million, 
of which approximately half are tribal peoples. The latter live 
at altitudes frequently in excess of 3,000 feet, in contrast to the 
Lao, who are lowlanders; hence, throughout the region the settle-
ments of hill tribes and the Lao are in general clearly separated, 
with the Lao inhabiting the flat alluvial land adjacent to the 
Mekong and its tributaries and the tribal peoples living in or 
above the high valleys and on the high plateau. 
The ethnic distribution of the hill tribes does not break down 
conveniently into regions, as many of them are scattered through-
out the country. An example is the "Kha" (Laotian word for 
"slave") group of tribes (some fifty different tribal peoples). 
They form about 25 percent of the total population, and although 
the largest concentrations are in the northwest and south, small 
pockets are also found in central Laos. The Meo (Miao) and 
Yao (Man) tribes, on the other hand, which may total as much 
as 100,000 or 5 percent of the population, have to date confined 
themselves exclusively to the portion of Laos north of Vientiane. 
The so-called Tai tribes comprise about 16 percent, or 320,000 
people, and live in widely scattered settlements chiefly in the 
mountain valleys of northern Laos. The three main tribes are 
Tai Dam (Black Tai), Tai Daeng (Red Tai), and Tai Khao 
(White Tai), but there are also Tai Phuan, Tai Neua, and Phou 
Tai (Phuthai). (These designations are made by the Lao accord-
ing to the color of traditional costumes, location, or some other 
characteristics, real or imagined.) 
The number of distinct languages and dialects spoken in Laos 
would be difficult to estimate, but the major division is between 
those who speak Tai languages and those who speak the Mon-
Khmer languages. In the former group are included the Lao 
and the Tai tribes, and in the latter are the so-called Kha tribes 
or Lao Theung. The Meo and Yao speak languages of another 
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unrelated family. There is no lingua franca for all these groups 
other than Lao, which is known only to a relatively small per-
centage of the "Kha," Meo, and Yao tribal peoples. The Tai 
tribes, whose dialects may be akin to Lao, may find it easier 
to understand spoken Lao. 
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND 
The oldest groups in the area, the so-called Kha, are considered 
by the Lao to be the original inhabitants and owners of the 
land. Their primary claim to the land is symbolically recognized 
in ceremonies, like those held at Luang Prabang, in which the 
Kha are defeated in a game which represents the ancient contest 
between their ancestors and the Tai-speaking invaders. Other 
tribal groups, such as the Meo and Yao (or Man), are compara-
tive newcomers to Laos, having arrived from the north, where 
the bulk of their population still remains, starting in about 1850. 
Relationships between the Tribes and with the Government. 
The considerable differences in background of the multi-ethnic 
population of Laos, lack of a common culture and language, and 
economic inequalities inherent in the differences in habitats are 
not conducive to easy assimilation. For centuries the Lao have 
provided the governing class; and, although they have developed 
a degree of cultural, economic, and political unity among them-
selves (disregarding dynastic rivalries) they have had little inter-
est in assimilating the non-Lao groups. Still, the tribes and mi-
norities have not been isolated. Administrative relations with 
non-Lao people have been created through official recognition 
of local village headmen (nai ban) and district chiefs (tasseng) 
(see Barney's paper on political connections between Meo and 
Lao and Kandre's paper on connections between Yao and Lao). 
There have also been extensive economic relationships 
between tribesmen and lowlanders. The role of the 7am (who 
is an ethnic Lao middleman) developed to regulate trade be-
tween Khmu"* and lowland Lao markets (Halpem 1964:94 ff.). 
The Meo engaged directly in the opium trade with Chinese 
traders and apparently also with the Lao (see Barney's paper). 
For years Khmu^ and Lamet have worked in the Laotian low-
lands and even in Thailand to earn money to buy prestige goods 
(drums and buffaloes) and other necessities (iron tools) (see 
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Izikowitz 1951). There are also ritual and s>Tnbolic mterdepen-
dencies betweecn hill people and lowlandcrs (Archaimbault 
1964). But despite these many interconnections, the ethnic 
groups have tended to remain distinct. 
Paradoxically, there is one factor arising from the civil war 
which may in time lead to a gradual breaking down of these 
inter-group barriers—the refugee problem and its solution. For 
the past twenty years or more Laos has been faced with the 
recurring influx of refugees from within its OVVTI borders. More 
recently this has become seasonal, for it results from Pathet 
Lao encroachments during the dry season (January to May). 
Thus in the majority of cases the refugees are tribal people who 
are ill-equipped to cope with the calamity of loss of home, posses-
sions, and means of livelihood. The hill people, of course, are 
primarily shifting cultivators, but in the past their moves have 
been planned and orderly. The dry season is the time when they 
prepare their fields for planting after the harvest. If they cannot 
prepare their fields, they cannot plant a crop for the following 
year. The tribal people now find they have nowhere in the jungle 
to which they can retreat. Their fields and their homes are always 
subject to destruction. 
In the past the degree of help they could expect depended 
largely on the region they hiippened to be in; if it was an area 
where a foreign agency or mission or its equivalent was operating 
in conjunction with Lao authorities, they would receive all the 
assistance available for immediate relief and long-term resettle-
ment. In general this still applies. The U.S. AID refugee program, 
without which the situation would be disastrous, now supports 
sonie 150,000 refugees throughout the country. These are people 
v/hp would be unable to subsist without periodic supplies of 
rice, clothing, medical supplies, etc. The majority of the refugees 
live in isolated areas that can be supplied only by air. U.S. AID 
and the Royal Lao Government activities are coordinated by 
the Social Welfare Adviser, U.S. AID, and the Director of the 
Social Welfare Department, Ministry of Social Welfare. 
Outside these areas the circumstances were, and still are to 
some extent, different. For example, where tribal refugees happen 
to come to the attention of the local authorites (through fear. 
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ignorance, or pride, many tribal headmen do not take the initia-
tive in reporting their predicament), they receive in theory an 
initial issue of food and welfare commodities such as rice, blan-
kets, etc.; but after this they are left to fend for themselves. 
Small wonder then that one finds scattered throughout the coun-
try groups of tribal refugees who through Pathet Lao pressure 
have at some stage been forced to leave their normal habitat 
and seek refuge in or near the main centers of population. The 
more developed and industrious tribes endeavor to adapt them-
selves to their new environment. A few succeed, whereas others 
who lack strong leadership and assistance are unable to over-
come their bewilderment and eke out a miserable existence. 
In summary, until quite recently the Laotian government has 
largely ignored the problems of refugee relief, particularly those 
involving resettlement and rehabilitation. When it has dealt with 
them, it has done so on a purely ad hoc and regional basis with-
out attempting to coordinate resources or formulate an overall 
policy. Of course it could be argued, and no doubt has been, 
that with an acute shortage of funds, bad communications, and 
many other fundamental deficiencies, refugee relief could not 
be accorded any priority. Besides, it clearly suited some political 
factions to discourage the introduction of a proper relief and 
resettlement program—starving refugees make a good talking 
point and a soft target for subversion. 
However, late in 1962 the Royal Lao Government requested 
the United Nations to arrange for a survey to be made of refugees 
and demobilized soldiers; the latter were included because at 
that time it was hoped to reduce gradually the strength of the 
armed forces of the country as unification progressed under the 
Government of National Union. The survey was conducted in 
early 1963, and some of the recommendations in the subsequent 
report form the basis of a new national program for resettlement 
of refugees now being developed by the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare under the guidance of a United Nations Resettlement 
Adviser. 
A modest start has now been made within the limitations im-
posed by financial support for the program and trained personnel; 
but more significant is the fact that the importance of resettle-
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ment properly planned and executed, and irrespective of the 
ethnic groups concerned, has at last been recognized by many 
in authority when hitherto it was understood only by a few. 
Generally speaking, the resettlement and agricultural develop-
ment programs in Laos are primarily for subsistence agriculture, 
owing to the poor communication system. There are, however, 
instances where a resettlement is located close enough to a town 
to make transportation economically feasible. In such cases the 
goal of agricultural development is a combination of production 
for both subsistence and for the local market. Virtually nothing 
has been done to develop markets either for the hill tribesmen 
or for the Lao, nor has there been any development of agricul-
tural credit. 
This particular facet of tribal administration, which is common 
to all countries of Southeast Asia to a greater or lesser degree, 
is being dwelt on at some length, since its satisfactory solution, 
in addition to improving the economy, health, and welfare of 
the tribal community concerned, can also go some way toward 
:)roviding the answer to the main problem of bridging the gap 
>etween central governments and their tribal peoples. In other 
words, through the medium of resettlement and its accompany-
ing benefits, the administrative machine becomes directly 
involved on a personal level with tribal people, possibly for the 
first time; and if this contact is made and developed with under-
standing and respect for tribal custom, beliefs, and tradition, 
it can hardly fail to improve relations. 
At this point it seems appropriate to consider briefly what 
resettlement really means, as its connotation is evidently not al-
ways clearly understood. Resettlement is the planned process 
of bringing the human and land resources of a country together 
for social economic ends. The social objective is primarily the 
development of viable communities, and the economic objective 
is normally agricultural production. There are other temporary 
objectives in certain circumstances, such as providing security 
and insulation against militant Communism and subversion. Per-
haps the best example of this was the vast resettlement program 
launched by the Malayan government during the Emergency 
in 1952: over a period of a few years one million of the mral 
population (mostly Chinese farmers) were moved from the jun-
'La. 
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gle fringes, where tliey were soft targets for Communist terrorist 
subversion, to properly planned New Villages. This not only 
afforded a reasonable degree of protection (Police, Home Guards, 
illuminated perimeters, etc.), but, more important, it enabled 
tlie civil authorities to introduce to these illiterate people a new 
way of life in the form of education, medical, and health services 
and improved agricultural methods. The people have often 
proved eager to leam. There were difficulties, of course, during 
the transitional period; but the viability of tlie concept has been 
proved and this program was the greatest single factor in the 
defeat, which took twelve years to accomphsh, of the Communist-
inspired insurrection. 
Included in this mass resettlement were tribal groups (aborigi-
nes) living in deep jungle, whom the Communist terrorists were 
using as screens, sources of intelligence, and food suppliers. Their 
resetdement posed additional problems, and experience showed 
that if it was to be a success, very special care and unlimited 
patience were required. Initially, some small groups were air-
lifted out of deep jungle; but no one had given sufficient thought 
to the group's wishes, since the military requirement was con-
sidered to be paramount. In some cases this action proved to 
be a fatal mistake, and the groups were taken back. The lesson 
was learned, and from then on a technique was evolved whereby 
small military units with an interpreter were deployed in deep 
jungle for long periods with the sole task of winning over tlie 
aborigines to the point where they would come out voluntarily. 
The time involved varied from a few weeks to many months, 
depending on the degree of contact the group had previously 
had with the Communist terrorists. 
It is relevant here to quote the views of tlie then Adviser 
to the Department of Aborigines on what he considered after 
long experience to be fundamental to the success of resettling 
tribal peoples: 
(a) Proper planning. Co-operation of the group concerned and their 
voluntary (not forced) agreement to the scheme. 
(b) Availability of suitable land voluntarily acceptable to the group; 
and assurance of Government approval to occupy the land. 
( c ) Government assistance in the form of: 
(i) Rationing until new cultivations are productive; 
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(ii) Welfare goods (clothing, tobacco etc.); 
(iii) Tools and implements necessary for house building and 
agriculture; 
( iv) Medical attention; 
( v ) Proper administration and protection once they have moved; 
(vi) Assistance to obtain employment if necessary; 
(vii) Education for the children. 
( d ) Unlimited patience; time for the community to adjust itself to 
its new circumstances and mode of life. Best achieved by arrang-
ing for an advance party from the group to move to the new area 
and prepare the way for the remainder. May take between six 
and twelve months to complete a move. If a change in agricul-
tural methods is involved, it will take longer. 
In concluding this scction, it can be said categorically that 
a good rapport between government and tribal peoples can only 
be achieved through genuine mutual confidence, which may take 
many months, if not years, of patient effort to establish. Deep-
seated prejudices must be overcome. Then and then only can 
a sense of belonging start to take root. If this sense is carefully 
fostered by all means available, it should lead ultimately to a 
closer identification with, and. participation in, the life and econ-
omy of the nation. 
GENERAL PLAN OF THE ACTION PROGRAM 
Unlike other countries in Southeast Asia with similar tribal 
problems, there is no ministry, department, or division of the 
Laotian government specifically responsible for the administra-
tion of the hill tribes. This probably arises from the fact that 
the constitution accords Laotian citizenship to all permanent resi-
dents; of Laos, regardless of race, who are not already citizens 
of another country; it also guarantees all citizens the same rights 
and privileges under the law, as well as the same type of ad-
ministration. In practice, these constitutional provisions do not 
generally apply to the tribal peoples, who in many cases still 
retain their autonomy. One example of the way the system may 
operate should be illustrative. The official languages of the courts 
are Lao and French. Tribal languages are barred from the courts, 
although tribal interpreters are supposed to be admitted. The 
point at question here is somewhat irrelevant, since under the 
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military conditions which have prevailed in Laos for many years, 
the normal court procedures have often been suspended. 
The main goal of the action program was to forge new and 
effective administrative links between government and the hill 
peoples both at central and provincial levels. At the central level 
it would be done by establishing, initially, the nucleus of a special 
department for the administration of the hill people; and at the 
provincial and district levels by closely involving tlie administra-
tions in specific capital aid and welfare projects for the benefit 
and development of the tribes. 
In addition to these relief and development programs for 
bringing government to the tribes, the intention is to introduce 
a radio program devised specifically for the tribal people of Laos 
and to broadcast in selected tribal languages. The precept here 
is that to achieve the ultimate goal of gradual assimilation of 
the tribal peoples into the national life and economy, the first 
and foremost essential is to be able to communicate with them. 
If this cannot be done initially through the medium of the na-
tional language (Lao) alone, then tribal languages must be uti-
lized in addition. 
PROGRESS OF THE ACTION PROGRAM 
The concept of a special department for the administration 
of the tribal peoples in Laos has been generally accepted in prin-
ciple, together with the policy aim that tribal people should be 
recruited to posts in the department when this step is found prac-
tical. At the present time, the staffing of such a department 
presents certain fundamental difficulties, the major ones being 
those of finance and personnel. Without the former, it is obvi-
ously not possible even to contemplate recruiting the latter. It 
would not answer the problem to second or borrow staff from 
other government departments on either a long-term or tempo-
rary basis. The secondment of staff was tried and proved a failure 
in the Thai government's Hill Tribe Development and Welfare 
Program, which inter alia calls for mobile extension teams. Sec-
ondment to the teams was unsatisfactory, and direct recruitment 
and training had to be used by the Hill Tribes Division of the 






L A O S : C . M Y L E S T . O S B O P N 
partment to another feel, with good reason, that their promotion 
prospects within their home department suffer (out of sight, out 
of mind). In addition, there are the usual problems of working 
in the field in areas where communications are poor, such as 
long delays in the pa)Tnent of already low salaries. 
Ideally, a department administering hill tribes should be 
largely self-contained, certainly with respect to the everyday 
needs of the tribes in the fields of agriculture, medicine and 
health, basic education, welfare, etc. The department should be 
able to develop and implement its projects independently with 
the assistance and advice provided by tribal research. There are 
many reasons for this—the fundamental one is the absolute 
necessity for the right approach. The wrong one can do irrepara-
ble damage. The key executive staff of the department should 
not only be qualified in their respective fields, but, equally impor-
tant, should have experience with hill people; and the extension 
workers who, after training, will often be operating without 
supervision in remote tribal areas, should be very carefully se-
lected. A sense of dedication, understanding, and hard work is 
essential for the effective functioning of a department adminis-
tering tribal peoples. 
Within the limitations imposed by finance, the intention would 
be to establish the nucleus of this department in Laos with a 
balanced field team of specialists in agriculture (including live-
stock), medicine and health, community development, and wel-
fare. Since such specialists are not presently available in the 
country, they would have to be recruited for a limited period 
from' outside; then Laotian counterparts would understudy them 
in tl^ eir field work. After acquiring field experience, the Laotians 
would need further training to fit them for administrative or 
semi-technical posts in the department. Once the process of es-
tablishing the nucleus was well under way, the creation of a 
cadre of extension workers and research facilities could be con-
sidered. Regarding the latter, the Laotian government might well 
profit from the Thai governments Tribal Research Centre in 
Chiengmai, where research and studies will cover at least some 
of the tribal groups common to both territories. Specific problems 
in which experience might be shared could include methods used 
to solve such problems as providing alternative cash crops to 
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replace opium, and the development of methods for training field 
staff. The Meo, Yao, Mussuh (Lahu), and Klimu^ are the chief 
opium cultivators in Laos—all but the latter are large-scale 
opium producers in Thailand as well. Opium is the mainstay 
of their economy. As in Thailand, this is very much of a potential 
problem in Laos, and one of great complexity. Of the many tribal 
revolts against the French regime in Laos, at least one, that of 
the Meo in Sam Neua Province in 1918, was caused in part by 
attempts of the French to collect a tax in the form of opium. 
The difficulties of lack of finance and expertise have been 
touched on, but it would be more than unrealistic to overlook 
or attempt to minimize the current problems arising from the 
confused internal political situation in Laos. This has tended 
to paralyze the administrative machine and deny to the govern-
ment access to large areas populated by tlie tribes. A further 
aggravation is the woefully low salary scale of government em-
ployees. High wartime prices, coupled with fixed salaries, means 
that there is little inducement to hard work and integrity on 
the part of government workers, and government service no 
longer attracts the best candidates. 
In the light of this somber picture one cannot help but reflect 
on the advisability of even attempting to create this new depart-
ment at the present time with so many factors conspiring against 
its viability. This is not a policy of despair; it is an honest ap-
praisal of the relevant facts, and it represents an equally genuine 
desire to ensure, as far as possible, that when government is 
properly introduced to the hill tribes in Laos, it has, at least, 
a reasonable chance of attaining its aims. 
In the meantime, a modest start has been made to generate 
government interest in tribal matters at the provincial and dis-
trict levels, by the launching of projects (schools, welfare, and 
wet-rice cultivation) exclusively benefiting certain tribal groups. 
Results so far are encouraging. A few radio sets have been dis-
tributed to selected tribal villages where Lao is understood, and 
undoubtedly much enjoyment is derived from the programs. 
There is an army transmitter at Luang Prabang, not a part of 
the national network, which broadcasts news in the Meo 
language for fifteen minutes every weekday, and Meo music for 
thirty minutes on Sundays. It is too early to evaluate this particu-
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lar medium, pending the introduction of a spccial tribal radio 
program and a larger distribution of receiving sets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
(a) There are now indications that as a result of the ever 
present refugee problem in Laos (the majority of refugees being 
tribal) there is developing awareness in tlie government of its 
responsibilities toward tlie hill people. 
(b) If this consciousness can be translated into impartial assis-
tance in the right manner, a big step forward will have been 
taken in the relations between the government and the hill tribes. 
(c ) Whereas the importance of establishing a special depart-
ment for administering the hill peoples is recognized, the con-
tinuing political instability and internal strife together with lack 
of finance, are cogent reasons against creating the department 
at the present time. The risks of it being stillborn are too great. 
(d) Plans for establishing the department should proceed with 
the firm objective of implementation when circumstances are 
more propitious. 
(e) In the meantime, eflForts should be concentrated on de-
veloping communications with the hill peoples. Radio seems to 
be the most practical method. Of course, this development must 
be carefully synchronized, with increased programming coordi-
nated with the distribution of more radio sets, since at present 
Radio Peking is already broadcasting extensively in some of the 
tribal languages. 
(f) Where government services (e.g. medical, educational and 
administrative) exist in predominantly tribal areas, much more 
could be done to promote a better understanding with the hill 
people through the medium of these services. 
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